

A Study on the Functions of *Nevertheless*

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1. Introduction

The purpose of this study is to examine functions of *nevertheless*. It is necessary to use conjunctions and connectives effectively in writing. English dictionaries, however, do not provide enough information to use them effectually. For example, the definition of *nevertheless* in *Roget's Thesaurus* is only “in spite of a preceding event or consideration.” Likewise, *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English dictionary* simply defines it as “in spite of a fact that you have just mentioned.”

Moreover, there are few previous studies on *nevertheless*. Because *nevertheless* is focused as one of the main targets of the study, Blakemore's (2000) study is noteworthy. Blakemore clarifies the procedural meaning of *but* and *nevertheless*, which is a relevance theoretic notion. Blakemore claims that the conception of procedural meaning as a constraint on contextual effects must include all information about the inferential processes involved in utterance interpretation, including context selection (p. 463).

This paper points out that Blakemore's analyses of *nevertheless* do not cover all the usage of *nevertheless*. Then, a comprehensive alternative definition of *nevertheless* is proposed.

Section 1 reviews Blakemore's analyses. In 1.1, the basics of relevance theory is taken up, and in 1.2, a relevance theoretic notion, the procedural meaning, is briefly explained. In 1.3, Blakemore's analyses on *but* and *nevertheless* is introduced. Section 2 gives consideration. In 2.1, counterexamples against Blakemore are shown. In 2.2, a comprehensive alternative definition is proposed. Section 3 concludes this paper.

1.1. Relevance Theory

Sperber & Wilson (1995, 2005) argue that the relevance theory consists of two principles about the role of relevance in cognition and communication as shown below:

I. Cognitive Principle of Relevance:

Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance.

II. Communicative Principle of Relevance:

Every act of overt communication conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance.

(Sperber & Wilson, 2005, pp. 470-471)

According to Blakemore (1987, 1989), discourse connectives such as *but* and *nevertheless* are effort-saving devices that indicate information on how to infer for the purpose of achieving relevance, and that help to derive cognitive effects at the least cost. In relevance theory, such information that constrains the derivation of implicated premises and conclusions is called procedural meaning. (Blakemore, 1987, 1989; Hall, 2004, 2007; Iten 1998, 2005).

1.2 Explicatures and Implicatures

Relevance theorists suggest that utterance interpretation requires two basic tools: representation and computation. As mentioned in the previous section, there are also two basic types in encoded meaning (Blakemore, 1987, 1989): conceptual meaning and the procedural meaning. While conceptual meaning is associated with representation, procedural meaning is linked with computation. Utterance interpretation involves decoding, which leads to an incomplete representation, and inference, the result of which is a set of fully propositional representations (Iten, 1998, p. 89). In the inferential process, “the explicatures, implicatures, and contextual assumptions are mutually adjusted in parallel until they form an inferentially sound relation, with premises (explicature, contextual assumptions) warranting conclusions (implicatures) (Carston & Hall, 2012, p. 18).” It means that “a hypothesis about an implicature can both precede and shape a hypothesis about an explicature (ibid.),” and “the inferential process must be consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance (ibid.),” as specified in the Communicative Principle of Relevance.

Sperber and Wilson (1995) developed the relevance theoretic approach to implicature as part of a broader attempt to shift pragmatics into a cognitive framework (Haugh, 2002, p. 119). The definitions on explicatures and implicatures by Sperber & Wilson (1986/95) are as below:

- (I) An assumption communicated by an utterance U is EXPLICIT [hence is an “explicature”] if and only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by U, where explicitness is a matter of degree: the greater the contribution of encoded meaning

the more explicit the explicature is and the greater the contribution of pragmatically inferred content the less explicit it is.

- (II) An assumption communicated by U which is not explicit is IMPLICIT [hence is an “implicature”].

(Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 182)

Haugh (2002) takes the following examples commonly found in Japanese, where utterances have unfinished endings, in order to demonstrate that the relevance theoretic definition of implicature by Sperber & Wilson (1986/95) needs to more explicitly describe the influence of their distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning on the scope of implicature. In example (1), Speaker A is asking Speaker B about whether he will go to the party and Speaker B’s response to Speaker A’s question implies that he will not go (the symbol +> means “implicates”). The symbols in the morphological glosses of Japanese examples (1) and (2) refer to the following: Pol = polite form; Q = question marker; Nom = nominative; Neg = negative form.

- (1) A: *Paatii ni iki-masu ka?*

party to go-Pol Q (Are you going to the party?)

B: *Chotto yooji ga ari-masu.*

a little business Nom have-Pol (I have a little something to do)

+> *Iki-ma-sen go-Pol-Neg* (I won't go) (Haugh, 2002, p. 124)

The proposition *ikimasen* ('I won't go') is regarded as an implicature. On the other hand, in example (2) where the linguistic unit *kara* ('so', 'therefore') is added to Speaker B's utterance, it should probably be considered to be an explicature because it has become part of a 'logical development' of Speaker B's utterance.

- (2) A: *Paatii ni iki-masu ka?*

party to go-Pol Q (Are you going to the party?)

B: *Chotto yooji ga ari-masu kara...[iki-mas-en]*

a little business Nom have-Pol so [go-Pol-Neg]

(I have a little something to do so...[I won't go]) (Ibid.)

However, given that “there are linguistic expressions, including so-called discourse connectives such as *but*, *so*, *after all* that encode procedural meaning which constrains the derivation of implicated premises and conclusions (Carston, 2001, footnote 3, p. 31),” *kara* (‘so’) encodes procedural meaning and therefore *ikimasen* (‘I won’t go’) can be considered an implicature in both examples (1) and (2).

2. Procedural Information on *But* and *Nevertheless* by Blakemore (2000)

Blakemore (2000) suggests *nevertheless* encodes two bits of procedural information as follows (p. 481):

1. *Nevertheless* encodes the information that the utterance is relevant as an answer to a question whose relevance has been established in the preceding discourse,
2. *Nevertheless* encodes the information that these contextual effects are to be derived in a context which provides evidence for a contrary answer.

On the other hand, Blakemore states that *but* encodes only one procedural information as follows (ibid):

But simply encodes the information that the hearer is expected to identify a contradiction which is resolved by the elimination of an assumption.

2.1. Blakemore’s (2000) Analysis

Focusing on *but*, *nevertheless* and *still* among markers of contrastivity, Blakemore (2000) argues that “the fact that *still* and *nevertheless* can be combined with *but* would seem to suggest that their contribution, while consistent with the meaning of *but*, is at the same time distinct from it. (p. 479)” See (3).

(3) A: She’s quite intelligent.

B: But nevertheless she’s not really what the department needs at the moment.

(Blakemore, 2000, p. 479)

Taking example (4) where *but* can be replaced by *nevertheless* (or *still*), Blakemore says that it looks difficult to draw the distinction.

- (4) a. She's a linguist, **but** she's quite intelligent.
b. She's a linguist. **Nevertheless** she's quite intelligent. (Ibid.)

However, Blakemore takes the following examples as a clue about where the difference lies. These examples show that in the utterances containing *but*, the use of *nevertheless* (or *still*) would be unacceptable or odd.

- (5) (a) [The speaker has just found the hearer eating the last slice of pizza.]
But I told you to leave some for tomorrow.
(b) [The speaker has just found the hearer eating the last slice of Pizza.]
?Nevertheless / Still, I told you to leave some for tomorrow. (Ibid.)
- (6) (a) A: We're ravenous. Can we have that pizza in the fridge?
B: Sure. **But** there's not very much left.
(b) A: We're ravenous. Can we have that pizza in the fridge?
?B: Sure. **Nevertheless / Still** there's not very much left. (Ibid., p. 480)
- (7) (a) I've been sent a copy of the grant proposal.
But it's in Dutch.
(b) I've been sent a copy of the grant proposal.
?Nevertheless / Still it's in Dutch. (Ibid.)

According to Blakemore, *but* in an example (6a) leads the hearer to a contradiction between a proposition communicated by the segment it introduces, which is shown in (8a), and a proposition made mutually manifest by the interpretation of the preceding utterance, that is (8b).

- (8) (a) There is not enough pizza for A and her friends.
(b) There is enough pizza for A and her friends. (Ibid.)

The hearer is supposed to abandon (8b) to resolve the contradiction. The utterance "there's not very much left" itself may lead the hearer to entertain other assumptions – for example, that it is relevant to know whether there is any other food in the house, or who was responsible for eating the pizza, but clearly it is not the intended relevance of the *but* segment. It lies in the elimination of the assumption that there is enough pizza for Speaker A

and her friends, and hence in the suggestion that the inference from the utterance of ‘Sure’ to (8b) is illegitimate. To be more precise, “Speaker B’s assumption that it is relevant to contradict the assumption in (8b) is based on her understanding that Speaker A would have otherwise taken her utterance of ‘Sure’ as evidence of its truth. (p. 480)” For Speaker A, there would have been no question about the factuality of (8b), and that the *but* segment would not be relevant as an answer to a question about the amount of pizza left. The uses of *nevertheless* in examples (6b) are odd because such a context does not match the procedural meaning of it; that is, as stated before, “for *nevertheless* to be acceptable, the second segment would have to be construed as an answer to a question in a context which includes a contradictory answer to the same question (Blakemore, 2002, p. 127).”

Blakemore gives example (9) to demonstrate that *nevertheless* is used to introduce an utterance which is relevant as an answer to the question posed by the previous speaker.

(9) A: There’s going to be quite a crowd tonight. Is there going to be enough food?

B: Well, there’s lots of salad and bread, and plenty of cheese. **Nevertheless** I think I might make another pizza. (Blakemore, 2002, p. 480)

The utterance “I think I might make another pizza.” contextually implies that the answer to this question is, ‘No, there isn’t enough food.’ More specifically, “its relevance as an answer to the question of whether there is enough food is computed in the context of an utterance which contextually implies that the answer is ‘There is enough food.’(p. 480)” Unlike the *but* example in (6a), however, the point of the utterance does not lie in the elimination of this assumption. In this context, the speaker is suggesting that the answer to the question raised by the utterance in (9A) is an issue or something to be negotiated and that the evidence for her answer has to be weighed against the evidence for the contrary answer given in the preceding segment. Weighing the evidence, in this case, does not result in the hearer’s eliminating the contrary answer because *nevertheless* is not responsible for the elimination of an assumption.

Blakemore (2000) says, “it is not always the case that the utterance introduced by *nevertheless* is relevant because it communicates a proposition that is relevant to an answer raised explicitly in the preceding discourse. (p. 481)” In example (10), the *nevertheless* segment is relevant as an answer to the question of whether strategies for dealing with the unexpected should be part of the curriculum for inexperienced language learners. It is not

the writer that actually poses the question. The reader is expected to infer on the basis of contextual assumptions and the principle of relevance.

- (10) Inexperienced language learners often express fears about jumping into conversations in a foreign language because they fear the unexpected. It is natural that learners in the early stages of learning should feel a need to stay firmly in familiar territory. **Nevertheless**, the unpredictable nature of much communication is a feature of naturally occurring language, and teachers have a responsibility to gradually expose learners to such language and enable them to develop strategies which will help them cope.

(Blakemore, 2000, p. 481)

While the answer communicated by the *nevertheless* segment is, 'Yes,' the reader is expected to recognize that its relevance will be computed in a context which suggests that the answer is 'No.' The function of *nevertheless*, in this case, is "to establish that there is an answer to a question made relevant by the opening segment of the passage which is contrary to an answer already given. (Blakemore, 2000, p. 481)" A little different explanation on it can be found in Blakemore. Blakemore mentions that the question could be 'how should teachers deal with language learner's fear of the unexpected,' and the answer suggested by the segment preceding *nevertheless* could be 'they should protect them from unexpected problems.' (p. 127). Either way, the function of *nevertheless* remains the same in both explanations.

Look at another example given by Blakemore (2002). The utterance "I am sure she is honest." conveys that the speaker of (11) does not doubt the honesty of the woman referred to as part of the dialogue in which the questions of the woman's honesty has arisen, if not explicitly or implicitly.

- (11) I am sure she is honest. **Nevertheless**, the papers are missing.

(Blakemore, 2002, p. 115, p. 124)

Blakemore states that this reassurance could be taken to suggest that the missing papers had nothing to do with this woman, which is contradicted by the *nevertheless* segment. For that reason, the hearer will understand that the speaker is suggesting that while he is not accusing the woman of dishonesty, he is accusing her of something to do with the loss of the

papers. (p. 124).

2. Consideration

Blakemore's (2000, 2002) suggestion seems to be perfect for all the examples taken up. The examples given in the next section, however, can not be explained by Blakemore.

2.1. Counterexamples against Blakemore (2000, 2002)

In Blakemore's (2000, 2002) observation, the basic units of the concessive relationship which *nevertheless* marks, seems to be an utterance as seen below:

An utterance U is relevant as an answer to a question if there is a mutually manifest assumption in the context which is an interpretation of some desirable proposition P and P is communicated (explicated or implicated) by U. (Blakemore, 2002, p. 126)

However, Csury (2013) claims that sentences, which can be called utterances, are not to be automatically considered as basic units of the semantic/pragmatic structure of discourse. Giving the example (12), Csury mentions that the sentence in which *nevertheless* is contained, [5], "stands in contrast with a clause at some distance backwards, denying or at least restricting expectations that one might draw from it as conclusion due to its argumentative power (p. 101)." In the examples which Csury takes up, "the number in brackets serve to identify syntactic units that are semantic blocks of a concessive realization of contrast at the same time. (p. 98)" (Henceforth, the underlines in the examples are the author's.)

- (12) [1] Hildreth states that, [2] As an interactive system the online catalog can dynamically communicate with its user, [3] it can be responsive and informative at a given time to a given need" [4] all of which was not possible in previous catalogues. [5] In the present system the level of communication is, NEVERTHELESS, limited and superficial.

(Csury, 2013, p. 101)




Figure 1

(Ibid.)

Csury argues that the concessive relation is obvious because of their lexical relatedness; “The verb *communicate* of the first unit being replicated in the nominal form *communication* in the second (p. 101).” However, two other units [3] and [4] are inserted between [2] and [5]. Csury continues that “in the former, the meaning of [2] is further developed whereas in [4] the author ends quoting directly his source and adds to the block formed by [2] and [3] some information on a previous state of affairs (ibid.).”

Csury takes the following example to show that connectives mark the relation of two clauses. The complex sentence will be regarded as an utterance in Blakemore (2000, 2002).

- (13) [1] Although Sam Rayburn affects a gruff exterior in many instances, [2] NEVERTHELESS he is fundamentally a man of warm heart and gentle disposition.

(Csury, 2013, p. 98)

Although the segments preceding and following *nevertheless* can be regarded as contradictory answers to a question, both segments are part of an utterance. This example is, therefore, a little problematic to Blakemore (2000, 2002).

The following examples also show that sentences are not to be automatically considered as basic units of the semantic/pragmatic structure of discourse.

- (14) a. Harry married a Belgian who **nevertheless** eats only hamburgers.

- b. Fluent speakers may **nevertheless** make mistakes in speaking.

(Okada, 1985)

The antecedent of the assumption “a Belgian” is part of the utterance. In addition, it seems impossible to find out a question which has been raised (explicitly or implicitly) by the preceding discourse or which has been made relevant through the interpretation of the preceding discourse.

Here is the same type of example from *The Washington Post*. As example (14), the antecedent of the assumption “an imperfect law” is part of the utterance. In this case, by the same token, it is difficult to infer a question which the segments preceding and following *nevertheless* can be taken to be contradictory answers to. See (15).

- (15) REPUBLICANS LAST week kicked off their dominance of Washington by vowing to push through an unpopular and unwise unraveling of the Affordable Care Act, an imperfect law that **nevertheless** has done much good [Emphasis added].
 (“Republicans have no clue how to keep their promises on Obamacare,” 2017, January 7).

Take a look at another example by Csury which shows that utterances are not to be automatically considered as basic units of the semantic/pragmatic structure of discourse. Csury states that “in (16), *nevertheless* marks a concessive relation between two adjectives qualifying the same referent (example) (p. 99).” See (16).

- (16) This understanding provides a very simple example of the fact that one can eliminate fear without instituting any controls. In fact, although we have dispelled the fear, we have not necessarily assured ourselves that there are no dangers. There is still the remote possibility of planetoid collision. A meteor could fall on San Francisco. Solar activities could presumably bring long periods of flood or drought. Our understanding of the elaborate rituals with the appropriate action which, in this case, amounts to doing nothing. Yet we no longer feel uneasy. This almost *trivial* example is NEVERTHELESS *suggestive*, for there are some elements in common between the antique fear that the days would get shorter and shorter and our present fear of war [Italics added].

(Csury, 2013, p. 99)

The antecedent of the assumption “This almost trivial example” is part of the clause. Unlike Blakemore’s (2000, 2002) analyses, the segments preceding and following *nevertheless* cannot be taken to be the evidence for discrepant answers to a question

inferred in the context.

The same type of example was found in *The Guardian*. See (17).

- (17) In the letter, he states: “The word god is for me nothing more than the expression and product of human weaknesses, the Bible a collection of *honourable*, but still primitive legends which are **nevertheless** pretty *childish*. No interpretation no matter how subtle can (for me) change this [Italics and emphasis added]”.

(Randerson, 2008, May 13, para. 5)

In this example, *nevertheless* marks a concessive relation between two adjectives *honourable* and *childish* describing the Bible, and at the same time *but still* marks the concessive relationship between two adjectives *honourable* and *primitive* qualifying the same referent (the Bible). The antecedent of the assumption “a collection of *honourable*, but still primitive legends” is part of the noun phrase. Besides, neither the segment precedes *nevertheless* nor what follows it can be seen as answers to a question inferred in the context.

The following example from Csury illustrates that “relations marked by connectives may extend beyond sentence boundaries (p. 99).” Figure 2 shows that the sentence including *nevertheless* is in a central position in the semantic-functional structure of this text fragment. Csury observes that “although we can interpret the chain of [3] and [4] separately from the rest, the former is tightly connected to [2] and [1] whereas the latter is developed by [5]and [6] (ibid.).” *Nevertheless* marks not only a concessive relation between [3] and [4] but also, indirectly, between the two blocks.

- (18) [1] Presumably, if the reserve is the case and the good effect is more certain than evil result that may be forthcoming, not only must the good and the evil be prudentially weighed and found proportionate, but also calculation of the probabilities and of the degree of certainty or uncertainty in the good and the evil effect must be taken into account. [2] There must not only be greater good than evil objectively in view, but also greater probability of actually doing more good than harm. [3] If an evil which is certain and extensive and immediate may rarely be compensated for by a problematic, speculative, future good, by the same token not every present, certain, and immediate good (or lesser evil) that may have to be done will be outweighed by a problematic, speculative, and future evil. [4] NEVERTHELESS, according to the traditional theory, a

man begins in the midst of action and he analyzes its nature and immediate consequences before or while putting it forth and causing these consequences. [5] He does not expect to be able to trammel up all the future consequences of his action. [6] Above all, he does not debate mere contingencies, and therefore, if these are possibly dreadful, find himself forced into inaction. (Csury, 2013, p. 99)




Figure 2

(Ibid., p. 100)

To sum up, the basic units of the concessive relationship shown by *nevertheless* can be between words, sentences, or blocks of sentences. Moreover, overt elements of the concessive relationship cannot always be coordinates.

2.2. An Alternative Comprehensive Definition

To solve the problem with Blakemore (2000, 2002), I propose the following definition. Since overt elements of the concessive relationship cannot always be coordinates, the basic units of the concessive relationship shown by *nevertheless* are not defined. The bottom line is that there must be counterparts to weigh, whether they are overt elements or covert ones.

1. *Nevertheless* signals the hearer or reader to find out a certain contradiction between the assumptions inferred from what precedes and what follows it, and to weigh them.
2. *Nevertheless* encodes the information that the speaker or writer strongly believes the

validity of the assumption which is inferred from what precedes *nevertheless*.

Now, Fraser (1999) states that sequence (19) is incoherent as it stands, but would be acceptable if the conversation were about someone who drowned and the steps that were taken to save him.

(19) A: How did Harry drown?

B: We put a flotation device on him. ***Nevertheless**, it slipped off. (Fraser, 1999, p. 941)

The utterance “We put a flotation device on him.” will make the hearer derive an assumption such as “he was saved by the flotation device.” However, the assumption is eliminated by the utterance “it slipped off,” which means that he was not saved by it. This kind of context is not suitable for the use of *nevertheless* because *nevertheless* signals the hearer or reader to weigh the contradictory assumptions inferred from what precedes and what follows it as well as to find out a certain contradiction between them. As Fraser says, if Speaker A asks what steps were taken to save him, the hearer will derive an assumption such as “As a matter of course, he should be saved by the flotation device.” from the utterance “We put a flotation device on him.” I added “As a matter of course” to the assumption to make it clear that the speaker or writer strongly believes the validity of the assumption which is inferred from what precedes *nevertheless*. Then, *nevertheless* introduces the utterance from which the hearer infer an assumption such as “he was not saved by it.” The point is that *nevertheless* signals the hearer to weigh them, not to delete the former assumption.

The example (5) shows that the antecedent of the assumption needs to exist explicitly. Otherwise, there will be no counterpart to weigh.

(5) (b) [The speaker has just found the hearer eating the last slice of Pizza.]

?**Nevertheless** / **Still**, I told you to leave some for tomorrow.

According to Okada (1985), the example (14a) means “Harry married a Belgian who eats only hamburgers even having her own cultural background of food,” and the example (14b) can be paraphrased as “Although you can speak fluently, you may make mistakes in speaking.”

- (14) a. Harry married a Belgian who **nevertheless** eats only hamburgers.
b. Fluent speakers may **nevertheless** make mistakes in speaking. (Okada, 1985)

As I mentioned earlier, the antecedent of the assumption is “a Belgian.” In example (14a), *nevertheless* shows the concessive relationship between a particular Belgian’s behavior and the speaker’s or the writer’s strong belief about the Belgian cultural background of food such as;

- (20) a. If she is a Belgian, she does not eat many hamburgers.
b. Belgian people normally do not eat hamburgers.

The assumption (implicature) in (20a) will be inferred from the speaker’s or the writer’s strong belief (20b). The assumption is contrasted with the assumption derived from the verb phrase “eats only hamburgers” such as;

- (21) There is a Belgian who eats only hamburgers.

Those two inconsistent assumptions are weighed. This is not the context where one assumption is deleted by another.

In example (14b), likewise, the speaker’s or the writer’s strong belief that, for instance, “fluent speakers” will not make mistakes is contrasted with the fact that they may make mistakes in speaking by the function of *nevertheless*. The reader or hearer is expected to weigh them.

In the example from *The Washington Post*, the antecedent of the assumption is “an imperfect law.”

- (15) REPUBLICANS LAST week kicked off their dominance of Washington by vowing to push through an unpopular and unwise unraveling of the Affordable Care Act, an *imperfect* law that **nevertheless** *has done much good*.
 (“Republicans have no clue how to keep their promises on Obamacare,” 2017, January 7).

The reader is expected to infer an assumption such as;

(22) If a law is imperfect, it cannot do much good.

Maybe through his life experience, the writer strongly believes the validity of the assumption which is inferred from the segment preceding *nevertheless* “an imperfect law.” The assumption is contrasted with the assumption derived from the segment following *nevertheless* “has done much good” such as;

(23) An imperfect law can do much good.

Because the writer strongly believes the validity of the assumption (22), the assumption cannot eliminate it. Instead, they are compared.

Let us have a look at the example found in *The Guardian*, which is the same type of the previous example.

(17) In the letter, he states: “The word god is for me nothing more than the expression and product of human weaknesses, the Bible a collection of *honourable*, but still primitive legends which are **nevertheless** pretty *childish*. No interpretation no matter how subtle can (for me) change this [Emphasis added]”. (Randerson, 2008, May 13, para. 5)

The antecedent of the assumption is “a collection of honourable, but still primitive legends.” An assumption, like (24a), is inferred based on the writer’s strong belief in the nature of things like (24b).

- (24) a. If the Bible is a collection of honourable legends, it is not childish.
- b. If things are honourable, they are not childish.

The assumption is contrasted with the conflicting assumption derived from the subjective complement “pretty *childish*” such as;

(25) The Bible is a collection of childish legends.

The reader is expected to compare the assumption (24a) with the assumption (25).

The next example is the case where *nevertheless* marks a concessive relation between two adjectives qualifying the same referent (example)."

- (16) This understanding provides a very simple example of the fact that one can eliminate fear without instituting any controls. In fact, although we have dispelled the fear, we have not necessarily assured ourselves that there are no dangers. There is still the remote possibility of planetoid collision. A meteor could fall on San Francisco. Solar activities could presumably bring long periods of flood or drought. Our understanding of the elaborate rituals with the appropriate action which, in this case, amounts to doing nothing. Yet we no longer feel uneasy. This almost *trivial* example is NEVERTHELSS *suggestive*, for there are some elements in common between the antique fear that the days would get shorter and shorter and our present fear of war. (Csurý, 2013, p. 99)

The writer strongly believes the validity of the assumption which is inferred from the segment preceding *nevertheless* “trivial example” such as;

- (26) If an example is trivial, it cannot be suggestive.

The assumption is contrasted with the incompatible assumption derived from the segment following *nevertheless* “suggestive” such as;

- (27) A trivial example can be suggestive.

Weighing those conflicting assumptions leads to understanding the writer’s surprise. If the assumption (26) is eliminated by the assumption (27), it will not be conveyed.

Let us move on to the example where sentences are not to be considered as basic units.

- (12) [1]Hildreth states that, “[2]As an interactive system the online catalog can dynamically communicate with its user, [3] it can be responsive and informative at a given time to a given need” [4] all of which was not possible in previous catalogues. [5]In the present system the level of communication is NEVERTHELESS, limited and superficial.

(Csurý, 2013, p. 101)

As Csurý (2013) mentions, given that the sentence containing *nevertheless*, [5], stands in contrast with the clause [2] at some distance backwards, the reader will infer an assumption

from the clause [2], “an interactive system the online catalog can dynamically communicate with its user,” such as;

- (28) If an interactive system can dynamically communicate with its user, it is very useful.

The assumption derived from the sentence [5] will be, for instance, as follows;

- (29) If an interactive system is limited and superficial, it is not very useful.

The reader is expected to weigh those assumptions. Although Csury says that expectations that one might draw from it as conclusion are denied or at least restricted due to the argumentative power as mentioned earlier, *nevertheless* is considered to have nothing to do with the elimination of an assumption in my proposal which is mostly based on the basics of Blakemore’s (2000, 2002) suggestion.

3. Conclusion

In this paper, the functions of *nevertheless* by Blakemore (2000, 2002) was reviewed. Blakemore’s observation is that the utterance introduced by *nevertheless* is relevant as an answer in a context which includes a contradictory assumption which is relevant to as an answer to the same question (Blakemore 2002, p. 127). It was shown, however, that there were some counterexamples to Blakemore: the relevance has been established in the preceding discourse, but the two contrasted items are not relevant as an answer to a question.

To solve the problem, an alternative proposal was made. The key is what the basic units of concessive relationship are. Although *nevertheless* works just like a coordinate conjunction in most cases, it was illustrated that elements to be weighed are not always equivalents.

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A Study on the Functions of *Nevertheless*

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Abstract

This paper reviews the functions of *nevertheless* suggested by Blakemore (2000, 2002). Blakemore argues that the utterance introduced by *nevertheless* is relevant as an answer in a context which includes a contradictory assumption which is relevant to as an answer to the same question (Blakemore 2002, p. 127). There are, however, some examples which show that, unlike Blakemore's observation, the two contrasted items are not relevant as an answer to a question, whose relevance has been established in the preceding discourse.

Therefore, an alternative proposal is made. The biggest difference lies in the basic units of concessive relationship. In most cases, *nevertheless* works just like a coordinate conjunction, but elements to be weighed are not always equivalents.